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Lessons from the Turn of the Twentieth
Century for First-Year Courses on
Legislation and Regulation
Kevin M. Stack

The rise of administrative bodies probably has been the most significant legal
trend of the last century and perhaps more values today are affected by their
decisions than by those of all the courts . . . .					
				− FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952)

Consider the following two arguments in favor of adopting a “legislation
and regulation” or “regulatory state” (“leg-reg”) course in the first year of law
school:
1. One of the basic aims of the first year of law school is to provide an overview
of the modern legal system and the general skills necessary to function as a
lawyer today.1 In light of those goals, a leg-reg course is a critical component of
the first year and has been for many years.2 That we live in an “age of statutes”
is old news;3 indeed, in our current era, regulations and decisions issued
by administrative agencies leave as deep a mark on our law as legislation.
If law and legal practice is dominated by statutes and agencies as primary
implementers of statutes, then a general introduction to these materials and
institutions deserves a place in the first year of law school.4
2. A basic goal of the first year is to provide students with the knowledge and
skills necessary and helpful to understanding the more specialized courses of
Kevin M. Stack is Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Research, Vanderbilt Law School.
1.

See Edward Rubin, What’s Wrong with Landell’s Method, and What to Do About It, 60 Vand. L. Rev.
609, 651 (2007).

2.

Id. at 622 (“The first-year, common-law curriculum simply does not reflect the impact of
the administrative state. . . . The failure to integrate [statutory and regulatory law] into that
curriculum disconnects it from the basic of modern practice in a manner that betrays that
curriculum’s intention. . . .”).

3.

See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes 1-2, 183 (1982) (“All
agree that modern American law is dominated by statutes.”).

4.

See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 1, at 651; Ethan J. Leib, Adding Legislation Courses to the First-Year
Curriculum, 58 J. Legal Educ. 166, 169-72 (2008); James J. Brudney, Legislation and Regulation in
the Core Curriculum: A Virtue or a Necessity?, J. Legal. Educ. 3, 6-16 (2015).
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their second and third years of law school.5 It is widely observed that law and
legal practice are increasingly specialized.6 Clusters of statutes, agencies, and
regulations play an important role in defining those specialties and shaping
how they are taught in law school. As a result, an introduction to statutes,
agencies, and forms of regulation provides critical context and skills for the
more specialized statutory and regulatory studies in upper-level courses.

These arguments both strike me as persuasive. What is puzzling is that these
same arguments could have been confidently pressed more than 70 years ago—
or, in line with the Supreme Court’s suggestion in my epigraph, considerably
before that. This extraordinary length of time, especially relative to the life of
legal education in the United States, suggests that something more than wellworn stories of faculty inertia or student distaste with things “administrative”
is at work in the slow pace of adoption of a leg-reg course in the first year.
To gain some insight and critical perspective, this essay looks back to
the arguments and debates stirred by the incorporation into the law school
curriculum of a related course that appeared exotic and now is a mainstay:
a credit-bearing class in administrative law. At the turn of the 20th century, a
small cluster of scholars—Frank Goodnow, Ernst Freund, and Bruce Wyman—
charted the first definitions and accounts of administrative law (so called) in
the United States, taught the first courses in the subject, and produced its first
teaching materials.
A brief look back at their conceptions of the field, and the resistance it
met, informs the debate over leg-reg courses in three ways. First, these early
scholars’ arguments for administrative law, made a century or more ago, add
further urgency to adoption of a first-year leg-reg course today. The resonance
of their arguments in the debate today shows how slowly legal education has
progressed, and how far we yet have to go, in synchronizing the “law” of law
school with the true dimensions of the legal order. Second, returning to these
early works provides a vantage point on the material to be covered in a leg-reg
course. There is a strong argument that part of what was left on the cuttingroom floor in the debate over what would be taught as part of “administrative
law”—the coverage of agency decision-making and internal administrative
law—deserves a prominent place in today’s first-year leg-reg courses. A firstyear course with coverage of the primary sources agencies produce and
examination of how agencies make decisions not only brings the first-year
curriculum closer to capturing this critical aspect of lawmaking today, but also
provides the groundwork for upper-level courses, including an upper-level
course in administrative law focused on judicial review.
5.

See Leib, supra note 4, at 171; Brudney, supra note 4, at 21-25 (2015).

6.

See Todd D. Rakoff, The Shape of Law in the Administrative State, 11 Tel Aviv U. Stud. L. 9, 9 (1992)
(“Probably the most common observation American lawyers make about American law is
that it is increasingly specialized.”); Rubin, supra note 1, at 657 (noting specialization as a
condition of American law). Professor Rakoff’s article includes a helpful diagram depicting
this specialization. See Rakoff, supra, at 6.
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Finally, examining the sources of resistance to these early courses exposes
deeper grounds for the continued wariness about a first-year leg-reg course in
a jurisprudence for which the case method is the privileged pedagogy. Indeed,
the recrudescence of interest in arguments that all administrative regulations
and decisions are not law or “unlawful”7 might have more to do with the failure
of law schools to provide a portrait of law that reflects its current form than the
wholesale illegality of the administrative state.
I. “Administrative Law” at the Turn of the Twentieth Century
Scholars at the turn of the 20th century made a powerful and simple
argument for the increasing importance of administrative law. Based on the
premise that the legislatures were creating more and more administrative
bodies and had vested them with greater powers to reach binding decisions,
it follows that the law governing how agencies and public officers act, and the
remedies private parties could seek from them—what these scholars came to
call “administrative law”—would play an ever more important role for lawyers.
Moreover, as these scholars recognized the centrality of this distinctive branch
of public law, they also sought to introduce it into the law school curriculum.
A. The Rise of the Administrative State and Administrative Law
One of the earliest and most forceful statements of the relevance of
administrative bodies and the law that governed them is found in the work of
Frank Goodnow, who held a joint appointment in law and political science at
Columbia University.8 In 1893, Goodnow produced a two-volume monograph
comparing the administrative structures in the United States with those of
England, France and Germany.9 Goodnow’s book convincingly argues for the
centrality of an administrative law that his work helped to define, and does so
in terms that speak directly to the grounds for a first-year leg-reg course today.
Goodnow launches his book with a declaration that could have been pulled
from the preface of any of the current course books for leg-reg classes: “A
detailed consideration of the directions of administrative action, as well of
its methods, is . . . a necessity for the practicing lawyer.”10 As we do today,
7.

See, e.g., Philip Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful? (2014). Professor Adrian
Vermeule’s review of Professor Hamburger’s book pointedly confronts the book’s denial
of the administrative state’s legality. See Adrian Vermeule, No, 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1547 (2015)
(review of Philip Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful?).

8.

William C. Chase, The American Law School
Government 48-49 (1982).

9.

Frank J. Goodnow, Comparative Administrative Law: An Analysis of the Administrative
Systems National and Local, of the United States, England, France and Germany,
Vols. I & II (1893) (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons).

10.

See Goodnow, supra note 9, at iv; compare with, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Edward L.
Rubin, & Kevin M. Stack, The Regulatory State xxi-xxii (2nd ed. 2013) (“Statutes and
regulations are paramount in this book because they are principal sources of law in our
modern regulatory state. . . . [T]he principal goal is practical: to provide an introduction to
the laws and institutions lawyers confront in their practices every day.”).

and the
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Goodnow connects the centrality of administrative law to the demands on
and developments of modern government. “Our modern complex social
conditions,” Goodnow writes, “are making enormous demands of the
administrative side of the government, demands which will not be satisfied
at all or which will be inadequately met unless a greater knowledge of
administrative law” is gained.11 In a few compact pages, Goodnow defends
administration as a necessary function of government. For Goodnow,
“administration” is the catch-all category of government action that falls
outside the work of the legislature and courts.12 “Whenever we see the
government in action as opposed to deliberation or the rendering of a judicial
decision, there we say is administration.”13 In this sense, “administration” is to
be found in all the manifestations of executive action, from the appointment
of officers, the assessment and collection of taxes, the training of an army, and
the investigation of a crime to the execution of a judgment.14
With this definition of administration as “the function of execution”—which
encompasses the chief executive and his “most humble . . . subordinates”15—
Goodnow’s argument for the centrality of administrative law unfolds easily,
though the term was unfamiliar at the time. Goodnow concedes that while
there is wide acknowledgment of the functions of administration, “there is
hardly an American or English lawyer who would recognize the existence of a
branch of law called administrative law.”16
Goodnow attributes this blind spot to an overreading of Professor Albert
Venn Dicey’s widely quoted declaration that “in England and in countries
which, like the United States, derive their civilization from English sources,
the system of administrative law and the very principles on which it rests are
unknown.”17 Dicey served as the Vinerian Professor of English Law at Oxford
and a fellow of All Souls from 1882 until 1909, and his Law of the Constitution
is viewed as one of the most important books on public law in the common
law tradition—and is also widely misunderstood.18 Goodnow explains that
in Dicey’s notorious passage distancing administrative law from the English
legal tradition, Dicey simply meant to deny the reception of a particular form
of the French droit administratif into English law, not the existence of a law
which “governs the relations of the executive and administrative authorities of
11.

See Goodnow, supra note 9, at iv.

12.

Id. at 1-2.

13.

Id. at 2.

14.

Id.

15.

Id. at 5.

16.

Id. at 6.

17.

See Goodnow, supra note 9, at 6 (quoting A.V. Dicey, The Law
ed. 304-05)).

18.

See Mark D. Walters, Dicey on Writing the Law of the Constitution, 32 Oxford. J. of Leg. Stud. 21
(2012).

of the

Constitution (3rd
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government.”19 In this larger sense, Goodnow argued, administrative law is an
inevitable aspect of the state and operates as a supplement and complement to
constitutional law.20 Whereas constitutional law sets the general organization
of the state, administrative law “fixes the organization of administrative
authorities” and “indicates what are the rights of the individual which the
administration must respect.”21 With an expanding set of tasks taken on by
government, it would be difficult to deny the centrality of the law that applies
to “government in action” for the lawyer and the citizen.
Goodnow was hardly alone in recognizing the critical role of administrative
law in the modern state and for contemporary lawyers. Goodnow’s student
Ernst Freund, who had a long tenure at the University of Chicago, and
Harvard’s Bruce Wyman also offered definitions of the field of administrative
law—and defended its centrality. In an 1894 article, Freund joined Goodnow
in arguing for acceptance of administrative law as a distinct field of public
law.22 For Freund, administrative law “regulates and limits government action
without involving constitutional questions;” its subject matter is “public affairs”
outside of legislation and the jurisdiction of the courts.23 Like Goodnow, Freund
saw the importance of this law as tied to the expanding powers of federal
administration.24 The Constitution, Freund observed, grants broad discretion
to the legislature to act; of the numerous statutes enacted, “the largest number
regulate, in some respect, [to] the administration of the government, creating
official powers or duties.”25 With the basic premise that executive lawmaking
was on the rise, it again follows easily that the law setting the constraints on
these new administrative functions was all the more important.26 In step with
Goodnow, Freund also “hoped that the term [administrative law] will become
more familiar to the public, and especially to the legal profession, than it is
as present.”27 In the same short span of years, the newly minted Harvard Law
19.

Goodnow, supra note 9, at 7; see also Edmund M. Parker, State and Official Immunity, 19 Harv.
L. Rev. 335, 336 (1906) (arguing that reading full discussion of Dicey’s chapter on droit
administratif makes clear he did not intend to deny that general common law governed the
duties of officials, and that he should not be so misread).

20.

Goodnow, supra note 9, at 8.

21.

Id.

22.

Ernst Freund, The Law of Administration in America, 9 Pol. Sci. Q. 403 (1894).

23.

Id. at 404.

24.

Id. at 408 (“Of course the peculiar sphere of federal administration aided this development
very materially”).

25.

Id. at 403.

26.

Interestingly, Freund also observed another phenomenon with strong contemporary
relevance—the increase of the president’s powers over administration, which “amount at the
present time to a substantial direction of national administration.” Id. at 408. With extensive
powers over personnel, Freund notices, “a strong executive naturally became the depository
of extensive delegated statutory powers.” Id.

27.

Id. at 404.
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School faculty member Bruce Wyman28 schematized administrative law as a
field in similar terms,29 and defended its place as constitutional law’s coordinate
branch of public law in his 1903 treatise based on his lectures in administrative
law.30
B. Introducing Instruction in “Administrative Law”
Recognizing the importance of administrative bodies and thus
“administrative law,” these scholars also sought to introduce this material to
law students and lawyers. Goodnow, Wyman, and Freund all produced books
that could be used for instructional purposes or were adapted from them.31
One of the most striking features of these treatments is how their coverage
differs from current conventional coverage in administrative law. Three
differences in their proposed coverage are most relevant for the coverage of
a leg-reg course. First, these early writers recognized and taught the role of
law internal to administration. Wyman’s The Principles of the Administrative Law
provides a robust treatment of the set of constraints internal to the executive
branch.32 Wyman classified administrative law as having two elements, an
“external administrative law” that pertains to the relations of officials to
citizens, and “an internal administrative law” that concerns the relations of
officers with one another:33
Internal law addresses “the fact that many officers are bound together in
action,” and thus seeks to expose “the position of the officer in his organization
and his function in its action.” (14) The internal law thus concerns the
allocation of authority among the many actors within the agency and the
practices by which their individual actions constitute a collective action on
behalf of the entity. Wyman acknowledges that this internal law is in part
positive, something discernible as a social fact or institutional practice. The
difficulty in studying administration, Wyman remarks, is “the problem is as
often institutional as it is legal.” (22) The “proper relations of the officials in
the administration is the institutional problem.” (23) But the internal law still
has normative content; it is concerned with the “proper” relations of officials
(23), “whether there has been proper or improper administration.” (20) The
internal law thus is the set of norms, procedures and practices that structure
and unite activities of officers into proper collective action.34
28.

Bruce Wyman, The Principles of the Administrative Law Governing the Relations of
Public Officers, With New Introduction by Kevin M. Stack iii (1903) (republished with
new introduction 2014).

29.

See Wyman, supra note 28.

30.

Id. at 23.

31.

See Goodnow, supra note 9; Wyman, supra note 28; Ernst Freund, Cases on Administrative
Law (1911).

32.

See generally Wyman, supra note 28.

33.

Id. at 4.

34.

Wyman, supra note 28, at xvi-xvii (quoting Stack’s Introduction) (with references in
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As Professor Jerry Mashaw has emphasized, this “internal administrative
law” has not been the focus of contemporary administrative law scholarship,
despite its importance to administrative legality.35 Outside of coverage of the
presidents’ executive orders providing for regulatory review,36 this internal law
also does not figure prominently in most administrative law courses today.
Second, Freund emphasized both the role of legislation and public
administration, including the methods agencies use to make decisions, as
critical features of administrative law. Because exercises of administrative
power must be authorized by legislation, Freund made clear that statutory
construction was to be a central occupation for administrative law.37 “[T]he
operation of general principles of administrative law is constantly affected,
and frequently controlled by, the language of statutes.”38 As a result, Freund
emphasized that statutory construction thus deserved a prominent place in a
course on administrative law.39 Indeed, Freund argued, in light of the “rapid and
enormous growth of public regulation of all kinds,” that principles of statutory
construction are “as deserving of careful study as common-law principles.”40
Statutory interpretation has been a constant occupation of administrative law,
but frequently only in the context of review of executive action. The current
iterations of leg-reg courses generally answer this call more systematically
than administrative law courses. In other writing, Freund also argued for a
greater presence of policy analysis, what we might call public administration,
of the methodology of agency decision-making within law schools’ coverage.41
Freund bemoaned the identification of the field of administrative law with
judicial decisions.42 What this did in law teaching, in Freund’s view, was
parentheses to the pages of Wyman’s treatise).
35.

See Jerry L. Mashaw, Creating the Administrative Constitution: The Lost One
Hundred Years of American Administrative Law 222-23 (2012); Peter L. Strauss, Rules,
Adjudications, and Other Sources of Law in an Executive Department: Reflections on the Interior Department’s
Administration of Mining Law, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 1231, 1233 (1974) (emphasizing importance of
internal law within the agency) Nestor M. Davidson & Ethan J. Leib, Regleprudence—at OIRA
and Beyond, 103 Geo. L.J. 259, 268-70 (2015) (calling for the development of a jurisprudence
that addresses the legal constraints, beyond the courts, on administrative activity); Daniel
A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of Administrative Law, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 1137
(2014) (calling attention to the importance of administrative law and practice beyond the
cognizance of the Administrative Procedure Act).

36.

See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993).

37.

Freund, Cases on Administrative Law, supra note 31, at 3.

38.

Id.

39.

Id.

40.

Id.

41.

Ernst Freund, The Correlation of Work for Higher Degrees in Graduate Schools and Law Schools, 11 Ill. L.
Rev. 301, 306-08 (1916) [hereinafter Freund, Correlation].

42.

Id., see also Daniel R. Ernst, Ernst Freund, Felix Frankfurter, and the American Rechtsstaat: A Transatlantic
Shipwreck, 1894-1932, 23 Studies in Am. Pol. Dev. 171, 175 (2009) (noting sources in which
Freud recognized “law could arise outside the courts”).
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leave “no room for the constructive aspect of public law” that should guide
policymaking under broad standards.43 Principles of common law and equity
were “by no means adequate guidance to needed readjustments of legal
relations” brought about by modern legislation.44 In this respect, Freund
urged the incorporation of social science into law schools.45
Finally, for these early writers and teachers, administrative law had a greater
horizontal scope than it does today. They treat subjects that clearly involve
the law governing the executive but have fallen outside of the coverage of
most administrative law courses. For instance, both Goodnow and Wyman
include extensive treatment of criminal prosecution by public officials.46 They
also included treatment of the executive conduct of foreign affairs.47 This
treatment follows from a comprehensive assessment of the law governing
executive officers, as both foreign affairs and criminal enforcement implicate
the executive. The treatment of these topics has been carved out of the analysis
of administrative law, with a few notable exceptions,48 and out of its course
coverage. While these subjects long have been elevated to separate fields and
courses, their contemporary convergence within national security agencies
today, which implicate criminal procedure rights and foreign affairs doctrines
at the same time,49 at least prompts the question of what is lost in the isolation
of these areas from a general law of executive constraint.
II. Resistance to Administrative Law
These early scholars appeared to have an unassailable argument for the
importance of administrative law. Based on the premise that statutes were
increasingly granting powers to administrative bodies, it would seem to
43.

Freund, Correlation, at 306; see also Chase, supra note 8, at 96-97; see also Ernst Freund,
Administrative Powers over Persons and Property 29 (1928).

44.

Freund, Correlation, supra note 41, at 306.

45.

See Freund, Correlation, supra note 41, at 308; see also Rubin, supra note 1, at 654 (arguing that
underemphasis on social policy represents a serious gap in legal education).

46.

See Wyman, supra note 28 (Chapter 10); Goodnow, supra note 9, vol. II, at 178-86.

47.

See Wyman, supra note 28, at 104-107; Goodnow, supra note 9, vol. I, at 2.

48.

See, e.g., Kenneth Culp Davis, Police Discretion (1975) (examining constraints on the
police); Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 715 (2005) (exploring
prosecution as a mode of administration); Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the
Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 869 (2009) (same);
Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Governing Policing, 90 N.Y.U L. Rev. (forthcoming
2015) (exposing how criminal prosecution has fallen outside of norms and treatment of
administrative law). For war powers from an administrative perspective, see, e.g., Curtis A.
Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 Va. L. Rev. 649 (2000) (examining war powers
from an administrative perspective); Ganesh Sitaraman, Foreign Hard Look Review, 66 Admin. L.
Rev. 489 (2014) (examining war powers from an administrative perspective).

49.

See, e.g., Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and Military
Detention Models, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1079 (2008) (arguing that there has been a convergence in
these two models in process and substantive criteria of detention).
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follow that administrative law—a body of law that governed the constraints on
executive action and legal remedies against administrative powers—would have
relevance for the classroom. Despite the logical and practical force of these
arguments, the path to adoption of credit-bearing course in administrative
law was uneven and took nearly a decade. Part of the reason for this delay
may have been that the underlying premises of a course in administrative law
sat uneasily with jurisprudential and pedagogical commitments of the time.
Indeed, those commitments required transformation of the administrative law
course into one that focused judicial review of agency action. They may also
undergird the continued reluctance to introduce these aspects of public law to
first-year students, or at least the continued impression of administrative forms
of lawmaking as outside the norm despite their ubiquity.
For our purposes of gaining insight into the sources of resistance to the
teaching of a leg-reg course in the first year, I treat the rich intellectual climate
of the era rather crudely, especially in comparison with the luminous histories
of the era.50 With a pragmatic focus, we can isolate two overlapping sets of ideas
that help to explain why teaching administrative law appeared exceptional,
and why the course needed to be normalized into the case method to gain
acceptance: conceptions of law that marginalized administrative regulations
(and legislation) and a commitment to instruction exclusively through the
case method.
A. Is it Law?
At the turn of the 20th century, jurisprudential commitments as to what
constitutes “law” challenged the critical premise of the argument for the
importance of administrative law, namely, that administrative bodies were
lawmakers.
Perhaps the most prominent and formal expression of this perspective
took the view that law consists of a set of principles, few in number, which
existed independent from any judicial or statutory decision. This position is
widely identified with the first dean of the Harvard Law School, Christopher
Columbus Langdell.51 One of Langdell’s colleagues and disciples, Professor
Joseph Beale, also articulates a strong form of this view.52 In line with Langdell,
Beale argued that law “is not a mere collection of arbitrary rules, but a body
50.

See, e.g., Ernst, supra note 42; Chase, supra note 8; Rubin, supra note 1, at 616-31; Neil Duxbury,
Patterns of American Jurisprudence (1995).

51.

Professor Thomas Grey provides a compact account of Langdell’s view of law as a science.
See Thomas G. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1, 6-13 (1983). One of the most
famous passages encapsulating Langdell’s view is the following, for which Grey provides
helpful commentary: “Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or
doctrines. To have such mastery of these as to be able to apply them with constant facility
and certainty to ever-tangled skein of human affairs, is what constitutes a true lawyer;…
[T]he number of fundamental legal doctrines is much less than commonly supposed.…”
Christopher Langdell, Cases on Contracts viii-ix (1st ed. 1871; 2nd ed. 1879).

52.

See Grey, supra note 51, at 34.
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of scientific principle.”53 As Neil Duxbury explains, if judges were to find, not
make, the law,54 “the function of changing the law has never been committed
by the sovereign to the judge, and consciously to make a change in the law
would be a usurpation on the part of the judge.”55 As a result, for Beale, “the
decision and judgment of a court . . . can in no sense be regarded as in itself
the law.”56
If the judge cannot change the law, then the law would exist independent
from the meddling of other institutions as well, such as the legislature and
administrative bodies. Indeed, for Beale, only rarely would a statute be
capable of “being assimilated into the common law; ”more typically, a statute
is “done by haphazard legislation by a legislature chosen not primarily for
its wisdom.”57 This jurisprudence denies the critical starting premise of the
argument for administrative law advanced by the early scholars, namely, that
administrative bodies were increasingly important lawmakers. Without that
premise, the argument for this new branch of law loses its force.
A second strain of thought at the time took a more positive turn, but was no
friendlier to administrative actions as a species of law. On this more positivist
approach, “the Law” is fully identified with judicial decisions. Another
Harvard Law School faculty member, John Chipman Gray, is the standard
bearer of this view. For Gray, “The Law of the State or any organized body of
men is composed of the rules which the courts, that is, the judicial organs of
that body, lay down for the determination of legal rights and duties.”58 Gray
distinguishes between sources of law and the Law itself, and considers both
statutes and administrative rules to be sources of law, but not the Law itself.59
As statutes do not interpret themselves, Grey writes, “it is with the meaning declared
by courts, and with no other meaning, that they are imposed upon the community as Law.”60
53.

Joseph H. Beale, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws 135 (1st ed. 1916); see also Duxbury,
supra note 50, at 22-23.

54.

See Duxbury, supra note 50, at 23.

55.

Id. (quoting Beale, supra note 53, at 148).

56.

Duxbury, supra note 46, at 23 (quoting Beale, supra note 49, at 153).

57.

For Beale, only rarely would a statute be capable of “being assimilated into the common
law”; more typically, a statute is “done by haphazard legislation by a legislature chosen
not primarily for its wisdom.” Notes by Robert Lee Hale from Jurisprudence Lectures given by Joseph
Henry Beale, 1909, 29 U. Miami L. Rev. 281, 297-301 (1975). Langdell held the same views. See
Grey, supra note 51, at 34-35 n.131. For a recent provocative treatment of legislation as a form
of common law, see Jeffrey Pojanowski, Reading Statutes in the Common Law Tradition, ___ Va.
L. Rev. ___ (forthcoming 2015) (arguing that the common law included a tradition for
understanding legislation as a form of common law).

58.

John Chipman Gray, The Nature and Sources of Law 84 (2nd ed. 1948, orig. pub. 1909).

59.

Id. at 112 (discussing administrative rules) and 170 (discussing statutes).

60.

Id. (emphasis in original). For Gray, it is the finality and superiority of courts that makes
their decisions “the Law,” and legislative and administration merely possible “sources” of it.
Id. at 172.
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Gray reaches the same conclusion with regard to administrative rules.61 This
full submission of law under the mantle of judicial decisions also denies the
core premise of the argument for teaching administrative law.
A melding of these views can be seen in Roscoe Pound’s 1907 pointed
challenge to administrative action.62 In the strongly worded essay, Pound
canvasses with concern the vast areas of law that have been delegated to
executive boards and commissions, often without a provision for judicial
review, in areas of land and water rights, elections, the handling of the
incarcerated, immigration, taxation, and the public health.63 Pound argues
that the resurgence of these forms of administrative action is “one of those
reversions to justice without law which are perennial in legal history and
serve, whenever a legal system fails for the time being to fulfill its purpose.”64
Indeed, for Pound, the reliance on executive actors or “executive justice”
is fundamentally opposed to law, and inevitably makes individuals’ rights
beholden to the arbitrariness of officials:
[Executive justice] is an attempt to adjust the relations of individuals
with each other and with the State summarily, according to the notions of
an executive officer for the time being as to what the public interest and a
square deal demand, unincumbered [sic] by rules. The fact that it is justice
without law is what commends it to a busy and a strenuous age. Hence we
must attribute the popularity of executive justice chiefly, if not wholly, to
defects in our present legal system; to the archaic organization of our courts,
to cumbrous, ineffective and unbusinesslike procedure, and to the waste of
time and money in the mere etiquette of justice which for historical reasons
disfigures American practice. Executive justice is an evil. It has always been
and it always will be crude and as variable as the personalities of officials.65

The contrast between Pound’s depiction of the growth of administration
as a growth of this “extra-legal—if not anti-legal—element”66 and Wyman’s
account of the internal law of administration could not be more stark. For
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Pound, executive discretion constitutes lawlessness; for Wyman, discretion is
a condition of not only the modern legal system—that “most of administration
is with discretionary powers”67—but also one that will involve the overlap of
administration and politics. Indeed, Wyman writes, “in the larger matters,
questions of administration cannot be separated from questions of politics.”68
But for Wyman, this overlap of administration and politics did not deny
administration its status as law; on the contrary, Wyman invites study into the
internal administrative law of the executive, including a national executive
common law.69
For one reason or another, Langdell, Beale, Grey, and Pound embraced
views of law which put administrative action outside of its purview. Once the
decisions and rules of administrative agencies are not understood as “law,”
the argument for including a course in administrative law loses its motivating
premise.
B. Can It Be Taught Through the Case Method?
Administrative law, at least as conceived by Goodnow, Freund, and
Wyman, encompassed more than judicial decisions reviewing agency action.
But teaching a course including coverage of more than court decisions directly
challenged the idea that law is to be taught solely through the case method. In
this confrontation, the case method won.
The circumstances surrounding Freund’s teaching of administrative law at
the University of Chicago provide a nice illustration of this clash. As part of
the University of Chicago’s effort to establish a law school, Chicago’s first
president, William R. Harper, arranged for one of Harvard Law School’s
prominent professors, none other than Joseph Beale, to serve as the first dean at
Chicago.70 As part of these early arrangements, Ernst Freund, who already had
an appointment at Chicago as a professor of political science, had meetings
with then-Professor Beale and Harvard’s Dean Ames to discuss the curriculum
of the new law school, which Freund was to join.71 This meeting prompted a
well-known letter from Dean Ames to President Harper on March 31, 1902.72
In the letter, Dean Ames emphasizes his commitment to a case-based method
of teaching in the context of warning Harper of Freund’s unconventional
views:
Our School is conspicuous for its belief in the learning of law by systematic
study of Cases. If Professor Beale is to be Dean with the purpose of
67.
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reproducing the Harvard method, he must have a Faculty that believe in
that method. Whether Professor Freund is convinced that this is the true way
of studying law I do not know. I did not ask him his views on the point.
Certainly his belief in the general methods of German Universities [sic], and
his general views as to the function of a law-school would predispose him
against a thoroughgoing belief in our methods.73

Beale emphasized these same points in his own letter to President Harper
following the meeting with Freund.74 Beale asked for assurance that “no
person shall teach in the school who does not frankly concur in adopting for
the school the spirit and the methods of Harvard Law School.”75 He also made
clear that the faculty should be “composed solely of persons who teach law in
the strict sense of the word.”76
This strong reaction to Freund’s proposals responded to more than
Freund’s views about administrative law, but they also had a decisive effect
on it as well. Shortly after Beale’s arrival at Chicago in 1902, it was established
that all instruction would be “entirely by the case method.”77 This had direct
consequences for Freund’s teaching of administrative law. As William Chase
reports, Dean Beale did not permit Freund to offer his administrative law
course to law students in the school’s first year, restricting his enrollment to
graduate students and undergraduates.78 “Not until the following year, when
Freund had worked up a course based on cases, was he permitted to offer
administrative law to law students. . . . ”79 While Freund’s eventual Cases on
Administrative Law shows that he clearly embraced the case method as part of
the pedagogy for law teaching,80 he did not understand all administration to
be reducible to case-based instruction.81 In a similar spirit, Wyman’s extensive
treatment of internal administrative law, existing largely outside the purview
of reviewing courts, also suggests that understanding the operation of the
administrative state requires looking beyond or outside of courts.82 But the
vision of administrative law that could fit within the jurisprudence and
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pedagogy of the time was case-based, and focused exclusively on administrative
law as the law of judicial control over and remedies from administration.
Though Freund acquiesced in teaching administrative law as a course in
judicial decisions, his dissatisfaction with this state of affairs shines through in
comments he made many years later: “[T]he more favorable the attitude of the
law school was to these subjects [including administrative law], the more they
tended to become pure law school subjects…; but incidentally the evolution
of these courses testifies to the absorbing and overmastering interest in the
judicial aspect of any branch of law that is administered by the courts.”83
III. Lessons for a First-Year Legislation and Regulation Course
What lessons concerning adoption of a first-year “legislation and regulation”
or “regulatory state” course can be gained from this brief tour of the history of
administrative law and its early teaching? At a most general level, this history
provides a cautionary tale of the ways in which abstract legal and pedagogical
commitments can divert teaching away from the law as it exists in action and
is practiced. As Robert W. Gordon observes, “[t]he consequence of these selfimposed limits to the province of ‘pure’ law was that the schools deliberately
kept their distance from a large and growing component of the work of their
most successful graduates.”84
This history thus provides clear guidance that the construction of the
first-year curriculum should begin with a mapping of the work of lawyers in
the modern legal system. This sounds obvious, but there remain surprising
omissions. Perhaps most fundamental is the level of continued reliance on
judicial decisions in courses on “legislation and regulation” and “regulatory
state” instead of providing direct exposure to legislation and the materials
produced by administrative agencies. The nonjudicial material that was
cut away from Freund’s course and left out of versions of administrative
law following Wyman’s lectures—legislation, the actual decisions and rules
of agencies, and internal constraints on agencies operating independently
from judicial review—still and even more urgently deserves a place in the
curriculum.85 Bernard Schwartz pressed this point so forcefully in 1959 in the
pages of this journal that I cannot resist quoting him at some length here:
Doubt about the case method as the sole tool for teaching law is now fairly
widespread in our law faculties. But the deficiencies of that method are
particularly apparent in administrative law. The limitations upon the scope
of judicial review in our system make a presentation of the administrative
process solely through court decisions only a skeleton-like one. Unless
administrative law students are to be placed in the position of Plato’s men,
83.
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who were chained in a cave and saw nothing but shadows, they must be given
some direct acquaintance with the actualities of agency life itself. A week’s
analysis of key decisions from the case law of an agency like the FCC would
teach students more about the way the federal agencies really operate than a
semester devoted exclusively to appellate court opinions.86

Based on the premise that law students, like lawyers, should confront primary
sources of law in the regulatory state,87 it does not make sense to replicate the
exclusive focus on judicial decisions in the newest addition to the curriculum,
the first-year leg-reg course. The course should include materials from the
legislative process, materials from rulemaking processes, agency adjudicative
decisions, and guidance alongside judicial decisions on statutory interpretation
and review of agency action, as Schwartz and his predecessors urged. At
the very least, the course should require students to read an entire statute, a
prominent piece of legislative history, such as a committee report, a notice of
proposed rulemaking (NPRM), a final rule, an example of agency guidance,
and an agency adjudicative decision. Moreover, a first-year leg-reg course is
the right occasion to introduce students directly these nonjudicial materials,
as this course is likely to be the only first-year course that provides direct and
considered study of these nonjudicial sources.
As to pedagogical approach, these nonjudicial materials should be
presented with the same pragmatic focus of judicial decisions. With court
decisions, instruction emphasizes applicative judgment, pushing students to
greater sophistication in arguing what prior judicial decisions stand for as they
apply them to new fact patterns. So too with primary legislation and regulation
materials. Instruction should emphasize how students interpret, argue from,
and challenge the validity of these legal sources. To do that, students will have
to be introduced to the basic legal tools that agencies rely upon in developing
their positions, including how agencies engage in statutory interpretation and
cost-benefit analysis, and how they use scientific and technical studies and
gauge their political environment. In a sense, this approach places agency
statutory implementation on par with judicial statutory construction; in both
cases, law students need to understand the modes of analysis and vocabulary
of legal justification, interpretation, and challenge. If agencies are the primary
implementers of federal statutes, the first-year leg-reg course should treat them
as such.
This approach also has advantages for the fit between the first-year legreg course and upper-level courses in administrative law. Providing a robust
overview of procedural forums of agency action as well as the legal operations
that they involve would provide a groundwork for the upper-level course in
administrative law, which would be an unapologetic study of judicial doctrines,
teaching to a population that has already seen agencies in action in the first
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year. A first-year course that provides more focus on the primary legal sources
of regulatory state and relatively less emphasis on traditional judicial decisions
taught in administrative law would reduce the problems of duplicate coverage
between the first-year offering and upper-level administrative law, and, in time,
uproot student perceptions that they need not take the upper-level course.88
A mapping of legal practice also reveals a tremendous volume of legal
work involved in the everyday tasks of following regulatory law, tasks that fall
under the label of “compliance” or “regulatory,” often identified with work
under particular statutes or agencies. This work involves knitting together
statutes, agency pronouncements and decisions of various kinds, including
legislative rules, interpretive rules or guidance documents, adjudicative
decisions, and other statements of particular effect. While current leg-reg
courses provide a solid overview of statutory interpretation by courts, they
do much less work with the interpretation of agency documents. Among the
most important sources of law in the United States are the “legislative rules” or
“regulations” produced by federal agencies through the notice-and-comment
process.89 In other writing, I have argued that our jurisprudence has fallen
behind in developing an approach to the interpretation of regulations.90 The
interpretation of regulations is a central task in legal compliance work, and
regulatory interpretation is also implicated in judicial review of the validity
of those regulations and the validity of subsequent agency interpretations of
them.91 According, treatment of the interpretation of regulations should take
its place alongside statutory interpretation as one of the basic interpretive
tasks confronting lawyers in our regulatory state.
Conclusion
When the gap between law teaching and law in action becomes too great,
“law as taught is mostly fiction.”92 The century-old dialogue about how to teach
basic elements of administrative law—statutory and regulatory interpretation,
an understanding of how agencies make law, and the doctrines of judicial
review of agency action—illustrates how long the law as taught can remain
88.
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isolated from a positivist understanding of the law as practiced. First-year
courses in “legislation and regulation” or the “regulatory state” are a critical
opportunity to help reduce the gap between law teaching and law in action—
and to provide first-year students a foundation for more advanced study of
specialized statutory and regulatory courses in the upper level. But to do so
these courses must not shy away from providing direct exposure to the primary
sources of law in the administrative state, sources beyond the judicial opinion.
Perhaps just as important, these courses give new prospects for shifting
the image of the law that so profoundly shapes law students’ conceptions in
their first year of law school. The commitment to the case method exacted
a price for absorbing administrative law into the law school curriculum; it
became a case-based course. Once this transformation occurred, teaching
of administrative law did not provide a fulcrum for shifting the focus of law
teaching to reflect the true dimension of the administrative state or lawyering
within it. As a result, the traditional course in administrative law does much
less than it otherwise might to shift law students’ “mental scenery of the law.”93
The real challenge for our new courses in “legislation and regulation” and the
“regulation state” may be to shift scenery of law that students see, and thus
their sense of what constitutes the norm and the peripheral among sources of
law.
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